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In recent decades, in developed economies, slack on the product and labor markets
has uctuated a lot over the business cycle, while ination has been very stable. At
the same time, these economies have been prone to enter long-lasting liquidity traps
with stable positive ination and high unemployment. Motivated by these observa-
tions, this paper develops a simple policy-oriented business-cycle model in which (1)
uctuations in aggregate demand and supply lead to uctuations in slack but not in
ination; and (2) the aggregate demand structure is consistent with permanent liquid-
ity traps. The model extends the money-in-the-utility-function model by introducing
matching frictions and including real wealth into the utility function. Matching fric-
tions allow us to represent slack and to consider a general equilibrium with constant
ination. Wealth in the utility function enriches the aggregate demand structure to
be consistent with permanent liquidity traps. We use the model to study the effects
of various aggregate demand and supply shocks, and to analyze several stabilization
policies—such as conventional monetary policy, helicopter drop of money, tax on
wealth, and government spending.
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1. Introduction
In the United States since the 1980s, slack on the product and labor markets has uctuated a lot
over the business cycle, while ination has been very stable. Figure 1 displays two measures of
slack on the product market (the rate of idle capacity and the rate of idle labor), one measures
of slack on the product market (the rate of unemployment), and the core ination rate. The
measures of slack are very countercyclical, whereas core ination is very stable around 2%. The
Great Recession is a good example of this pattern: from the beginning of 2008 to the middle of
2009, the rate of idle labor increased from 19% to 33%, the rate of idle capacity from 24% to 40%,
the rate of unemployment increased from 5% to 10%, while the core ination rate only fell from
2.1% to 1.2%.1
Moreover, economies with low and stable ination seem prone to enter long-lasting liquidity
traps aer negative shocks. The ZLB episode that started in 1995 in Japan has been lasting for
more than twenty years. The ZLB episode that started in 2009 in the euro area has been lasting
for more than 10 years. And the ZLB episode that occurred in the United States aer the Great
Recession lasted 8 years, from 2008 to 2015.
Motivated by these two observations we develop a model of the business cycle in which
uctuations in demand and supply lead to uctuations in slack but not in ination, and in which
liquidity trapsmay be long-lasting or even permanent. Ourmodel offers a perspective on business
cycles which differs from that of the standard New Keynesian model. In that model uctuations
in demand and supply lead to uctuations in ination but not in slack, and long-lasting liquidity
traps generate an array of anomalies. We then use our model to analyze several monetary and
scal policies. We contrast the effects of these policies in and out of liquidity traps.
Our model has a simple structure since it only adds two elements to the money-in-the-utility
model of Sidrauski (1967). The rst element is matching frictions on the market where self-
employed households sell labor services to other households. In modeling matching frictions we
followMichaillat and Saez (2015, 2019b).2 Michaillat and Saez (2015) also provide a broad range of
1A possible explanation for the stability of ination is that monetary policy maintains ination constant. But this
seems implausible. First, the mandate of monetary policy is to stabilize both slack and ination, so it is unlikely that
monetary policy solely focuses on stabilizing ination. Second, there is good empirical evidence that in the short
run monetary policy does not have much inuence on ination: most empirical studies nd that monetary policy
barely contributes to short-run price movements. For instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) nd that
ination responds only modestly and with long delays to monetary policy: in vector autoregressions, the response of
ination to monetary policy is not statistically signicant, and it has a lag of two years.
2The models in Michaillat and Saez (2015, 2019b) do not feature interest-bearing assets, so they cannot be used
to think about monetary policy or liquidity traps. Michaillat and Saez (2019b, sec. 2) highlight the similarities and
differences between the matching framework used here and the canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Most of the differences arise from the need to have a framework adapted to address run-of-the-mill business-cycle
and policy questions.
1
evidence suggesting that matching frictions are prevalent on the US labor and product markets.
In a matching market households are unable to sell all their labor services, so slack emerges
naturally. Moreover, there is no presumption that the equilibrium amount of slack is efcient:
there may be too much slack (a slump) or too little (a boom).
Furthermore, motivated by the behavior of ination observed in the data, we will assume
that ination is xed, determined by a social norm.3 This social norm could determined by
communication from the central bank in the long run; but in the short run, which is the horizon
of the model, nothing affects the ination rate. This approach to modeling prices in a matching
model is inspired by Hall (2005). The advantage of the approach is that accepting xed ination
is bilaterally efcient for sellers and buyers: in any trade, buyer and seller prefer transacting at
the price given by xed ination than either not transacting (since there is a surplus from any
transaction) or transacting with somebody else later on (since searching for a new trade partner
is costly). Accordingly, the assumption of xed ination rests on solid theoretical grounds in our
matching model, unlike assumptions of xed prices in non-matching models (Barro 1977). In this
general equilibria with constant ination, market tightness adjusts to equalize aggregate supply
and demand.
The second element is the presence of real wealth in the utility function. This assumption
allows us to obtain a well-behaved model in liquidity traps, as showed in Michaillat and Saez
(2019c).4 In fact, a liquidity trap with positive ination—and thus negative real interest rate—
and high unemployment is a possible steady-state equilibrium. Permanent liquidity traps exist
because the consumption Euler equation is modied with wealth in the utility. The motivation
for the wealth-in-the-utility assumption is that people seem to care about real wealth not only
as future consumption but for its own sake. People may value wealth because it is commonly
used to rank people in societies and thus high wealth provides high social status (Weiss and
Fershtman 1998; Heffetz and Frank 2011; Fiske 2010; Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland 2015;
Cheng and Tracy 2013; Ridgeway 2014; Mattan, Kubota, and Cloutier 2017). People may also
desire to accumulate wealth as an end in itself. Recent neuroscientic evidence suggests that
these considerations matter (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2005). The wealth-in-the-utility
assumption has also been found useful across a broad range of elds, which provides additional
albeit indirect support for it. For example, the assumption has been used in models of long-
run growth (Kurz 1968; Konrad 1992; Zou 1994; Corneo and Jeanne 1997; Futagami and Shibata
3Ination has become extremely hard to forecast aer 1984. Stock and Watson (2008) nd that it has become
exceedingly difcult to improve systematically upon simple univariate forecasting models. In particular, it is difcult
to describe the sluggish dynamics of ination with standard accelerationist Phillips curves (for example, Rudd and
Whelan 2007; Gordon 2011; Ball and Mazumder 2011). The behavior of ination over the past two decades led Hall
(2011) to argue that ination is exogenous for all practical purposes.
4The model in Michaillat and Saez (2019c) is New Keynesian so it does not feature any slack or unemployment.
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Figure 1. Slack and ination in the United States, 1994–2014
The rate of idle capacity is one minus the rate of capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector measured by
the Census Bureau from the Survey of Plant Capacity. The rate of idle labor is one minus the operating rate in the
manufacturing sector measured by the Institute for Supply Management. The rate of unemployment is the civilian
unemployment rate measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from the Current Population Survey. The rate of core
ination is the percent change from year ago of the personal consumption expenditures index (excluding food and
energy) constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as part of the National Income and Product Accounts. The
rates of idle capacity and idle labor are quarterly series. The rates of unemployment and core ination are quarterly
averages of seasonally adjusted monthly series.
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1998), risk attitudes (Robson 1992; Clemens 2004), asset pricing (Bakshi and Chen 1996; Gong
and Zou 2002; Kamihigashi 2008; Michau, Ono, and Schlegl 2018), life-cycle consumption (Zou
1995; Carroll 2000; Francis 2009; Straub 2019), social stratication (Long and Shimomura 2004),
international macroeconomics (Fisher 2005; Fisher and Hof 2005), nancial crises (Kumhof,
Ranciere, and Winant 2015), optimal taxation (Saez and Stantcheva 2018), and, closely related to
our topic, secular stagnation (Ono 2001; Murota and Ono 2012; Ono and Yamada 2018; Michau
2018; Cuba-Borda and Singh 2019).
Our model is simple enough to inspect the mechanisms behind business cycles and analyze a
broad range of stabilization policies. Indeed, the steady-state equilibrium is represented with
an IS and a LM curve depicted in a (consumption, interest rate) plane, and an AD and an AS
curve depicted in a (consumption, market tightness) plane. The IS curve describes the trade-off
between holding wealth and consumption. The LM curve describes the trade-off between holding
money and consumption. The AD curve is obtained at the intersection of the IS and LM curves.
The AS curve describes the supply of labor and the matching on the labor market. Furthermore,
comparative statics completely describe the response of the equilibrium to unexpected shocks
because there are no state variables and the system is a source so the equilibrium jumps from
one steady state to another aer such shocks.
Using the IS-LM-AD-AS representation, we analyze various aggregate demand and supply
shocks and several monetary and scal policies. We nd that a negative aggregate demand shock
leads to lower output and lower tightness while a negative aggregate supply shock leads to lower
output but higher tightness. Aer an aggregate shock, several policies are useful to stabilize the
economy. A conventional monetary policy issuing money through open market operations can
stabilize the economy in normal times but not in a liquidity trap—when the nominal interest rate
falls to zero. In a liquidity trap, other policies can stabilize the economy: for instance, a helicopter
drop of money, a wealth tax, or budget-balanced government spending.
Although the approximation that ination is constant seems useful and realistic to describe
the short run, this approximation may be unsatisfactory to describe the medium run. To describe
medium-run ination uctuations, we combine directed search as in Moen (1997) with costly
price adjustments as in Rotemberg (1982). We obtain a model in which ination slowly responds
to slack. Sellers decrease their prices when the economy is slack and increase them when the
economy is tight, which generates ination dynamics described by a Phillips curve. For instance,
aer a negative aggregate demand shock, slack increases and ination decreases; the lower price
level stimulates aggregate demand until the economy returns to the efcient steady state.
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2. Model
Themodel extends themoney-in-the-utility-functionmodel of Sidrauski (1967) by addingmatching
frictions on themarket for labor services and wealth in the utility function. The economy consists
of a measure 1 of identical households who hold money and bonds, produce labor services, and
purchase labor services from other households for their own consumption.5
2.1. Money and bonds
Households can issue or buy riskless nominal bonds. Bonds are traded on a perfectly competitive
market. At time t , households hold B(t) bonds, and the rate of return on bonds is the nominal
interest rate i(t).
A quantityM(t) of money circulates at time t . Money is issued by the government through
open market operations: the government buys bonds issued by households with money. At any
time t , the quantity of bonds issued equals the quantity of money put in circulation:− ÛB(t) = ÛM(t).
Initially, −B(0) = M(0). Therefore, at any time t ,
(1) − B(t) = M(t).
The representative household is net borrower: B(t) ≤ 0. At time t , the revenue from seignorage is
S(t) = −B(t) · i(t) = i(t) ·M(t).
The government rebates this revenue lump sum to households. Without public spending or taxes,
the government’s budget is therefore balanced at any time.
Finally, money is the unit of account. At time t , the price level is p(t), the rate of ination is
pi (t) = Ûp(t)/p(t), and the quantity of real money in circulation ism(t) = M(t)/p(t).
2.2. Labor services
The market for labor services is modeled as in Michaillat and Saez (2015, 2019b).
Informal description. As the market for labor services is not standard, we begin by describing it
informally, borrowing fromMichaillat and Saez (2019b, sec. 2).
5To simplify the analysis, we abstract from rms and assume that all production directly takes place within
households. Michaillat and Saez (2015) show how the model can be extended to include a labor market and a product
market, distinct but formally symmetric. In such extension, rms hire workers on the labor market and sell their
production on the product market.
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People perform services for pay: they cook, clean, educate children, cut hair, do administrative
work, garden, and so on. To capture the fact that a modern economy is based onmarket exchange
rather than home production, we assume that people work for others and use the income to hire
their own cooks, cleaners, nannies, and so on.
Beside purchasing services, people also save using money and bonds, which provides utility.
The tradeoff between services and wealth determines aggregate demand for services.
People are hired by other people. The people hired by other people produce labor services:
cleaning or cooking. People value private services.
People are hired on amatchingmarket. This means that while people are available to work for
forty hours a week, they are not working the whole time. For simplicity, we assume that everybody
is idle for the same number of hours each week. Since unemployment is equally spread over the
population, everybody has the same consumption, and insurance is not an issue. Once hired,
everyone is paid the same price for their services.
This alsomeans that people need to post help-wanted ads to hire services. Posting ads requires
labor: workers have to create the ads, read applications, and interview applicants. The time
devoted to recruiting by these human-resource workers depends on the number of positions
to be lled and the time spent lling each position. The services supplied by human-resource
workers are not consumed—in the sense that they do not provide utility—but they are necessary
to hire other workers whose services are consumed (provide utility).
The state of the services market is described by a tightness variable—the ratio of help-wanted
ads to productive capacity. When tightness is higher, it is easier to nd work but harder to recruit
workers. Consequently, the unemployment rate is lower, and employers devote a larger share of
their workforce to recruiting.
There is an efcient tightness, which maximizes the amount of services that are consumed
(provide utility). When tightness is inefciently low, workers are unemployed for too many hours,
so the amount of services consumed is too low. When tightness is inefciently high, too many
hours are devoted to human-resource tasks, so the amount of services consumed is also too low.
In this economy, two variables—tightness and price—equalize demand and supply. If the price
is high, demand for services is low. If tightness were high, people would nd work easily and
the supply of services would be high. But then demand could not equal supply. Hence, tightness
must be low in equilibrium. If instead the price is low, demand is high, and tightness must be
high. Effectively, for any price, tightness adjusts to equalize demand and supply. The price can
be determined in many ways—bargained between employer and worker, xed by a social norm,
or set by government regulation—but once the price mechanism is specied, the equilibrium is
unique. There is no guarantee, however, that the price ensures efciency.
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Formal description. Households sell labor services on a market with matching frictions. House-
holds would like to sellk units of services at any point in time. The capacityk of each household is
exogenous. Households also consume labor services, but they cannot consume their own services,
so they trade with other households. To buy labor services, households postv(t) help-wanted
advertisements at time t .
A matching function h with constant returns to scale gives the number of trades at time t :
y(t) = h(k,v(t)).
The matching function is twice differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments, and with
diminishing marginal returns in both arguments. It also satises 0 ≤ h(k,v(t)) ≤ min{k,v(t)}.6
In each trade, one unit of labor service is bought at price p(t) > 0.
Themarket tightnessx is dened byx(t) = v(t)/k.With constant returns to scale inmatching,
the market tightness determines the probabilities to trade for sellers and buyers. At time t , one
labor service is sold with probability
f (x(t)) = y(t)
k
= h(1,x(t)),
and one help-wanted advertisement leads to a trade with probability
q(x(t)) = y(t)
v(t) = h
(
1
x(t) , 1
)
.
We denote by 1 − η and −η the elasticities of f and q: 1 − η ≡ x · f ′(x)/f (x) > 0 and η ≡
−x ·q′(x)/q(x) > 0. We abstract from randomness at the household’s level: at time t , a household
sells f (x(t)) · k labor services and purchases q(x(t)) · v(t) labor services with certainty.
Households are unable to sell all their labor services since f (x(t)) ≤ 1. Households are idle a
fraction 1− f (x(t)) of the time. The rate of idleness can be interpreted as the unemployment rate
in this economy of self-employed workers. Since h is strictly increasing in its two arguments, f is
strictly increasing and q is strictly decreasing in x . This means that when the market tightness
is lower, it is harder for households to sell their labor services but easier for them to buy labor
services from others.
Posting help-wanted advertisements is costly. The ow cost of an advertisement is ρ ≥ 0
units of labor services so that a total of ρ · v(t) recruiting services are spent at time t . These
recruiting services represent the resources devoted to matching with an appropriate worker.
Recruiting services are purchased like any other labor services. As output of labor services is
6Such a matching function is h(k,v) = (k−ζ +v−ζ )−1/ζ with ζ > 0 (den Haan, Ramey, and Watson 2000).
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used for consumption, denoted c(t), and recruiting, we have y(t) = c(t) + ρ · v(t). Only labor
services for consumption enter households’ utility function; labor services for recruiting do not.
Thus it is consumption and not output that matters for welfare.7
The number of help-wanted advertisements is related to consumption by
q(x(t)) · v(t) = y(t) = c(t) + ρ · v(t)
Therefore, the desired level of consumption determines the number of advertisements:v(t) =
c(t)/[q(x(t)) − ρ]. Hence, consuming one unit of services requires to purchase 1+ ρ ·v(t)/c(t) =
1 + τ (x(t)) units of services where
τ (x(t)) = ρ
q(x(t)) − ρ .
The function τ is positive and strictly increasing for all x ∈ [0,xm) where xm > 0 satises
ρ = q(xm). Furthermore, limx→xm τ (x) = +∞. The elasticity of τ is η · (1 + τ (x)).
We characterize the efcient market tightness x∗, which maximizes consumption given the
matching frictions. In equilibrium,
(2) c(t) = y(t)
1 + τ (x(t)) =
f (x(t))
1 + τ (x(t)) · k .
Since 1/(1 + τ (x)) = 1 − ρ/q(x) and q(x) = f (x)/x , we obtain
(3) c(t) = [f (x(t)) − ρ · x(t)] · k .
This equation says that ρ · x(t) · k = ρ ·v(t) units of services are dissipated in matching frictions.
As established by Michaillat and Saez (2015), the tightness that maximizes consumption, x∗ =
argmax[f (x) − ρ · x] · k, is uniquely dened by f ′(x∗) = ρ. An equivalent denition is τ (x∗) =
(1−η)/η. This denition will be useful when we study the Phillips curve arising from costly price
adjustment in section 5. The efcient tightness is the tightness underlying the condition of Hosios
(1990) for efciency in a matching model.
The market can be in three regimes. The market is slack if a marginal increase in tightness
increases consumption, tight if a marginal increase in tightness decreases consumption, and
efcient if a marginal increase in tightness has no effect on consumption. Equivalently, the
market is slack if x(t) < x∗, efcient if x(t) = x∗, and tight if x(t) > x∗. If tightness is efcient on
7This denition of consumption is different from that in national accounts, where y(t) would be called consump-
tion, but dening consumption as output net of recruiting costs is common in the matching literature (for example,
Gertler and Trigari 2009).
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Figure 2. Capacity, output, unsold capacity, and consumption
average, then business cycles are a succession of slack and tight episodes.
Figure 2 summarizes the relation betweenmarket tightness and different quantities. Capacity,
k, is a vertical line, independent of tightness. Output, y = f (x) · k, is increasing in tightness
as it is easier to sell services when tightness is high. Consumption, c = f (x) · k/[1 + τ (x)] =
[f (x) − ρ · x] · k, rst increases and then decreases in tightness. At the efcient tightness, the
consumption curve is vertical. The difference between output and consumption are recruiting
services, ρ ·v = ρ ·k ·x . The difference between capacity and output is idle capacity, (1− f (x)) ·k.
2.3. Household’s problem
Households spend part of their income on labor services and save part of it as money and bonds.
The law of motion of the representative household’s assets is
ÛB(t) + ÛM(t) = p(t) · f (x(t)) · k − p(t) · [1 + τ (x(t))] · c(t) + i(t) · B(t) + S(t).
Here,M(t) aremoney balances, B(t) are bond holdings,p(t) is the price of services, [1 + τ (x(t))] ·
c(t) is the quantity of services purchased, f (x(t)) · k is the quantity of services sold, and S(t) is
lump-sum transfer of seignorage revenue from the government. LetA(t) = M(t) + B(t) denote
nominal nancial wealth at time t . The law of motion can be rewritten as
ÛA(t) = p(t) · f (x(t)) · k − p(t) · [1 + τ (x(t))] · c(t) − i(t) ·M(t) + i(t) · A(t) + S(t).
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Let a(t) = A(t)/p(t) denote real nancial wealth at time t and s(t) = S(t)/p(t) real transfer of
seignorage. Since Ûa(t)/a(t) = ÛA(t)/A(t) − pi (t), we have Ûa(t) = ( ÛA(t) − pi (t) · A(t)) /p(t), and the
law of motion can be rewritten as
(4) Ûa(t) = f (x(t)) · k − [1 + τ (x(t))] · c(t) − i(t) ·m(t) + r (t) · a(t) + s(t),
where r (t) ≡ i(t) − pi (t) is the real interest rate at time t . This ow budget constraint is standard
but for two differences arising from the presence of matching frictions on the labor market. First,
income k is discounted by a factor f (x(t)) ≤ 1 as only a fraction f (x(t)) of k is actually sold.
Second, consumption c(t) has a price wedge 1 + τ (x(t)) ≥ 1 because resources are dissipated in
recruiting: consuming one unit of services requires buying 1 + τ (x(t)) units of services.
Households experience utility from consuming labor services and holding real money bal-
ances and real wealth. Their instantaneous utility function isu(c(t),m(t),a(t)), whereu is strictly
increasing in its three arguments, strictly concave, and twice differentiable. The assumptions
that real money balances and real wealth enter the utility function are critical to obtain a nonde-
generate IS-LM system, and obtain permanent liquidity traps. The utility function of a household
at time 0 is the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities
(5)
∫ +∞
0
e−δ ·t · u(c(t),m(t),a(t))dt ,
where δ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Throughout, [x(t)]+∞t=0 denotes the continuous-time
path of variable x(t).
Definition 1. The representative household’s problem is to choose paths for consumption, real
money balances, and real wealth [c(t),m(t),a(t)]+∞t=0 to maximize (5) subject to (4), taking as given
initial real wealth a(0) = 0 and the paths for market tightness, nominal interest rate, ination,
and seignorage [x(t), i(t),pi (t), s(t)]+∞t=0 .
Concretely, themodel can be seen as the Sidrauskimodel with two additions. First, real wealth
a(t) enters the utility function. Second, matching frictions lower labor income by a factor f (x(t))
and increase the effective price of consumption by a factor 1 + τ (x(t)). Because x(t) is taken as
given by households, the model can be solved exactly as the original Sidrauski model. To solve
the household’s problem, we set up the current-value Hamiltonian:
H(t , c(t),m(t),a(t)) = u(c(t),m(t),a(t))
+ λ(t) · { f (x(t)) · k − [1 + τ (x(t))] · c(t) − i(t) ·m(t) + r (t) · a(t) + s(t)}
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with control variables c(t) andm(t), state variable a(t), and current-value costate variable λ(t).
Throughout we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. The necessary conditions for an
interior solution to this maximization problem are
Hc(t , c(t),m(t),a(t)) = 0
Hm(t , c(t),m(t),a(t)) = 0
Ha(t , c(t),m(t),a(t)) = δ · λ(t) − Ûλ(t),
and the transversality condition limt→+∞ e−δ ·t · λ(t) · a(t) = 0. Given thatu is concave in (c,m,a)
and thatH is the sum ofu and a linear function of (c,m,a),H is concave in (c,m,a) and these
conditions are also sufcient.
These three conditions imply that
uc(c(t),m(t),a(t)) = λ(t) · [1 + τ (x(t))](6)
um(c(t),m(t),a(t)) = λ(t) · i(t)(7)
ua(c(t),m(t),a(t)) = [δ − r (t)] · λ(t) − Ûλ(t).(8)
Equations (6) and (7) imply that themarginal utilities from consumption and real money balances
satisfy
(9) um(c(t),m(t),a(t)) = i(t)1 + τ (x(t)) · uc(c(t),m(t),a(t)).
In steady state, this equation yields the LM curve. It represents a demand for money. The demand
for real money is declining with i(t) because i(t) is the implicit price of holding money paying
zero nominal interest instead of bonds paying a nominal interest rate i(t).
Equations (6) and (8) imply that the marginal utilities from consumption and real wealth
satisfy
(10) [1 + τ (x(t))] · ua(c(t),m(t),a(t))
uc(c(t),m(t),a(t)) + [r (t) − δ ] = −
Ûλ(t)
λ(t) ,
where Ûλ(t)/λ(t) can be expressed as a function of c(t),m(t), a(t), x(t), and their derivatives
using (6). This is the consumption Euler equation. In steady state, this equation yields the IS
curve. It represents a demand for saving in part from intertemporal consumption-smoothing
considerations and in part from the utility provided by wealth.8
8If there are no matching costs (ρ = 0 and hence τ (x) = 0) and if the utility only depends on consumption
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2.4. Equilibriumwith constant ination
We now dene and characterize the equilibrium with constant ination.
Definition 2. An equilibrium with constant ination pi consists of paths for market tightness,
consumption, real money balances, money supply, real wealth, nominal interest rate, and price
level, [x(t), c(t),m(t),M(t),a(t), i(t),p(t)]+∞t=0 , such that the following conditions hold: (i) [c(t),m(t),a(t)]+∞t=0
solve the representative household’s problem; (ii) monetary policy determines [M(t)]+∞t=0 ; (iii) the
money market clears; (iv) the bond market clears; (v) actual tightness on the market for services
equals the tightness taken as given by households for their optimization problem; and (vi) [p(t)]+∞t=0
is a continuous function of time t satisfying the dierential equation Ûp(t) = pi · p(t) with initial
condition p(0) = 1.
Conditions (i)–(v) are standard equilibrium conditions in a Walrasian economy. They im-
pose that households optimize taking as given prices and trading probabilities, and that trading
probabilities are realized.9 These would be the equilibrium conditions in the Sidrauski model.
Conditions (i)–(v) generate six independent equations. Since the equilibrium consists of seven
variables, the equilibrium denition is incomplete with these conditions only. This incomplete-
ness arises from the presence of matching frictions on the market for labor services, which
adds one aggregate variable—the market tightness. We therefore need a pricing mechanism to
complete the equilibrium denition. It is common in the matching literature to use bargaining
as a pricing mechanism. Here, we choose instead a pricing mechanism that generates constant
ination. Namely, we impose that the price process is exogenous and grows at constant ination
rate pi . (The initial condition p(0) = 1 is a normalization.) The price process responds neither
to slack nor to monetary policy. If pi = 0, the price is constant over time. This criterion seems
appropriate to describe the short run in the United States because ination has been very sluggish
there since the 1990s.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium with constant ination pi consists of paths of market tightness,
consumption, real money balances, money supply, real wealth, nominal interest rate, and price
level, [x(t), c(t),m(t),M(t),a(t), i(t),p(t)]+∞t=0 , that satisfy the following seven conditions: (i) equa-
tion (9) holds; (ii) equation (10) holds; (iii) [M(t)]+∞t=0 is determined by monetary policy; (iv)m(t) =
M(t)/p(t); (v) a(t) = 0; (vi) equation (3) holds; and (vii) Ûp(t) = pi · p(t) with p(0) = 1.
(ua = um = 0), this Euler equation reduces to the standard continuous-time consumption Euler equation, [r (t) − δ ] ·
ϵ = Ûc(t)/c(t), where ϵ ≡ −u ′(c)/[c · u ′′(c)] is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
9In a Walrasian market, agents behave under the assumption that they can buy or sell any quantity at the posted
price; that is, they take as given a trading probability of 1. The equilibrium requirement that supply equals demand
ensure that agents can actually buy or sell the quantity they desire in equilibrium, ensuring that the trading probability
of 1 is realized in equilibrium.
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The proposition offers a simple characterization of the equilibrium. The conditions listed
in the proposition follow almost immediately from those in the denition. In particular, the
condition that the bond market clears yields a(t) = 0, and the condition that actual tightness
equals posted tightness yields (3).
3. Properties of the equilibrium
In this section we analyze the equilibrium with constant ination. We represent the steady state
of the equilibrium with an IS curve and a LM curve depicted in a (consumption, interest rate)
plane, and an AD curve and an AS curve depicted in a (consumption, market tightness) plane.
This graphical representation is useful to analyze the comparative static effects of shocks and
policies in section 4. We also study the transitional dynamics of the equilibrium.
To obtain closed-form expressions for the curves, we assume that the utility function is
separable in consumption, real money, and real wealth:
u(c,m,a) = ϵ
ϵ − 1 ·
(
c
ϵ−1
ϵ − 1
)
+ ϕ(m) + ω(a).(11)
The curvature of utility over consumption is measured by ϵ ≥ 1. The functionϕ is strictly concave
and strictly increasing on [0,m∗] and constant on [m∗,+∞). The quantitym∗ ∈ (0,∞) is a bliss
point in real money balances; the bliss point is required to obtain liquidity traps. The function
ω is strictly concave and strictly increasing on (−∞,+∞). As wealth is zero in aggregate, the
key parameter is the marginal utility of wealth at zero,ω′(0). We assume thatω′(0) ∈ (0,+∞); a
positive marginal utility of wealth is also required to obtain liquidity traps. The functions ϕ andω
are depicted in gure 3.
3.1. IS, LM, AD, and AS curves
We dene the IS, LM, AD, and AS curves that we use to represent the steady state.
Definition 3. The LM curve cLM is a function of nominal interest rate, market tightness, and
real money balances dened by
cLM (i,x ,m) =
[
i
[1 + τ (x)] · ϕ′(m)
]ϵ
for all i ∈ [0,+∞), all x ∈ [0,xm], and allm ∈ [0,m∗). When real money balances are above the
money bliss point (m ≥ m∗), the LM curve determines a unique nominal interest rate: iLM (x ,m) =
0 for all x ∈ [0,xm] and allm ∈ [m∗,+∞). In this situation the economy is in a liquidity trap.
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Figure 3. Utility functions over money and wealth
The LM curve is the amount of consumption that solves equation (9). The LM curve is dened
separately form below and above the bliss point because whenm is above the bliss point,ϕ′(m) =
0 so (9) is degenerate and imposes i = 0.
Definition 4. The IS curve cIS is a function of nominal interest rate, market tightness, and
ination dened by
cIS (i,x ,pi ) =
[
δ + pi − i
[1 + τ (x)] · ω′(0)
]ϵ
for all i ∈ [0,δ + pi ], all x ∈ [0,xm], and all pi ∈ [−δ ,+∞). If marginal utility of wealth is zero
(ω′(0) = 0), the IS curve determines a unique interest rate: iIS (x ,pi ) = pi + δ for all x ∈ [0,xm]
and all pi ∈ [−δ ,+∞).
The IS curve is the amount of consumption that solves equation (10) when Ûλ(t) = 0. Although
the IS curve is expressed with ination and nominal interest rate, it only depends on the real
interest rate, r = i − pi . The IS curve is dened separately when the marginal utility of wealth
is positive or zero because when the marginal utility of wealth is zero, (10) is degenerate and
imposes r = δ .
The properties of the IS and LM curves are illustrated in gure 4.10 First, panel A shows
that the LM curve is upward sloping in a (c, i) plane. This property follows the standard logic.
Money does not pay interests; therefore, demand for real money is decreasing with i as a higher i
increases the opportunity cost of holding money. Demand for real money is increasing in c as a
higher c reduces the marginal utility of consumption, which makes real money more attractive
relative to consumption. Given that real money balances are constant, an increase in i requires
10The linear IS and LM curves in gure 4 correspond to the case with log utility over consumption (ϵ = 1).
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an increase in c to maintain equilibrium. Through the same logic, an increase in real money
balances shis the LM curve out, as illustrated in panel C.
Second, panel A shows that the IS curve is downward sloping in a (c, i) plane. The intuition is
the following. For a given ination, a higher i leads to a higher r and a higher marginal value of
savings through bonds via the wealth effect r ·ω′(0), which makes holding wealth more attractive.
Since wealth is zero in equilibrium, c must decline for households to be indifferent between
saving and consumption. This logic also implies that an increase in ination, which reduces r
for a given i, shis the IS curve out, as showed in panel D. By the same logic, a decrease in the
marginal utility of wealth shis the IS curve out, as showed in panel E. An increase in the discount
rate has the same effect, as showed in panel F.
Third, the IS and LM curves shi outward when market tightness decreases, as illustrated in
panel B. The logic is that a lower tightness reduces the effective price of labor services, (1+τ (x))·p,
which makes consumption of labor services more desirable relative to holding bonds or money.
However, the nominal interest rate dened by the intersection of the IS and LM curves does
not depend on tightness: the IS and LM curves shi by commensurate amounts such that the
equilibrium interest rate remains the same.
Fourth, the LM curve prevents the nominal interest rate from falling below zero because the
marginal utility of moneyϕ′(m) is nonnegative. If the nominal interest rate were negative, money
would strictly dominate bonds. When real money is at or above the bliss pointm∗, the LM curve
becomes horizontal at i = 0, as illustrated in panel A of gure 5. Real money balances do not
affect the LM curve any more. This situation of liquidity trap has important implications to which
we will come back.
Fih, without utility of wealth, the IS curve becomes horizontal at i = δ + pi as depicted
in panel B of gure 5. The intuition is well known: steady-state consumption is constant so
households hold bonds only if the return on bonds, r = i − pi , equals the subjective discount rate,
δ . With utility of wealth, r < δ as households also experience utility from wealth holding.
The equilibrium interest rate is given by the intersection of the IS and LM curves. The equality
cIS (i,x ,pi ) = cLM (i,x ,m) implies that the equilibrium nominal interest rate is
i =
ϕ′(m)
ϕ′(m) + ω′(0) · (δ + pi ) .(12)
At that interest rate households are indifferent between money and bonds. The equilibrium real
interest rate is
r =
ϕ′(m)
ϕ′(m) + ω′(0) · δ −
ω′(0)
ϕ′(m) + ω′(0) · pi .
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Next, we construct the AD curve by plugging (12) into the LM curve:
Definition 5. The AD curve cAD is a function of market tightness, ination, and real money
balances dened by
(13) cAD(x ,pi ,m) =
[
δ + pi
[1 + τ (x)] · (ϕ′(m) + ω′(0))
]ϵ
for all x ∈ [0,xm], all pi ∈ [−δ ,+∞), and allm ∈ [0,∞).
The AD curve represents the consumption level obtained at the intersection of the IS and
LM curves. The AD curve is downward sloping in a (c,x) plane, as illustrated in panel A of
gure 8. The logic for this property is displayed in panel B of gure 4, where ca = cAD(xa,pi ,m),
cb = c
AD(xb ,pi ,m) with xa > xb , and clearly ca < cb . In fact, all the properties of the AD curve
follow from the mechanisms illustrated in gure 4 and discussed above. For instance, the AD
curve shis out aer an increase in the discount rate, an increase in the ination rate, or a
decrease in the marginal utility of wealth, as these changes shi the IS curve out. The AD curve
also shis out aer an increase in real money balances, as this change shis the LM curve out.
Last, we dene the AS curve:
Definition 6. The AS curve is a function of market tightness dened by
cAS (x) = [f (x) − ρ · x] · k
for all x ∈ [0,xm].
The AS curve is the consumption level arising from thematching process on the labor market,
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plotted in gure 2. The AS curve is showed in panel A of gure 8. An increase in capacity shis
the AS curve out.
3.2. Steady state
The steady state of the equilibrium with constant ination is as follows:
Proposition 2. The steady state of the equilibrium with constant ination pi consists of mar-
ket tightness, consumption, real money balances, level of money supply, growth rate of money
supply, and nominal interest rate, (x , c,m,M(0), ÛM/M, i), such that cLM (i,x ,m) = cIS (i,x ,pi ),
cAD(x ,pi ,m) = cAS (x), c = cAS (x), M(0) is set by monetary policy, ÛM/M = pi ; and m =
M(0)/p(0) = M(0).
The steady state consists of 6 variables determined by 6 conditions. In steady state, the price
grows at a constant, exogenous ination rate pi . The money supply,M(t), must also grows at rate
pi but monetary policy does not control pi . Hence, changing the growth rate ofM(t) is not within
the scope of the analysis under constant ination. Since the price level is unaffected by monetary
policy, monetary policy controls real money balances by controlling the level of money supply.
Whenm is large enough (m > m∗), the steady state is in a liquidity trap, with a nominal
interest rate at 0. This steady state is unique. Hence, the model easily accommodates permanent
liquidity traps. This is a desirable feature of the model since low-ination economies seem prone
to enter long liquidity traps aer a large negative shock: the ZLB episode that started in 1995 in
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Japan lasted for more than twenty years without sustained deation; the ZLB episode that started
in 2009 in the euro area lasted for more than 10 years without sustained deation either; the same
is true of the ZLB episode that occurred in the United States between 2008 and 2015.
3.3. Transitional dynamics
Herewedescribe the transitional dynamics toward the steady state. The dynamical systemdescrib-
ing the equilibrium is characterized in proposition 1. We focus here on one single endogenous
variable: the costate variable λ(t). All the variables can be recovered from λ(t).
In equilibrium, wealth is zero so the law of motion for the costate variable from equation (8)
is ω′(0) = (δ + pi − i(t)) · λ(t) − Ûλ(t). Both money supply and price grow at a constant rate pi
so real money balances are constant:m(t) = M(0)/p(0) = m. Hence, equation (7) implies that
i(t) · λ(t) = ϕ′(m), and the law of motion of the costate variable in equilibrium is
Ûλ(t) = (δ + pi ) · λ(t) − ω′(0) − ϕ′(m) ≡ F (λ(t)).
The steady-state value of the costate variable satises F (λ) = 0 so λ = (ω′(0) + ϕ′(m))/(δ + pi ).
The nature of the dynamical system is given by the sign of F ′(λ). Since F ′(λ) = δ + pi > 0, the
system is a source. We represent the phase diagram for the system in gure 6.
As there is no state variable, the system jumps from one steady state to the other in response
to an unexpected shock—the transitional dynamics are immediate. This is illustrated in panel A
of gure 7 where the equilibrium jumps from λa to λb at time t0 when an unexpected shock occur.
The values λa and λb are the steady-state values of λ for the parameters values before and aer
time t0. Accordingly, comparative-statics analysis is sufcient to completely describe the behavior
of the system aer unexpected shocks.
The transitional dynamics are a bit different in response to an expected shock. This is illus-
trated in panel B of gure 7. An announcement is made at time t0 that a shock changing the
steady-state value of λ from λa to λb will occur at time t1. A key property of the system is that
absent new information, λ is a continuous variable of time so λ can only jump at time t0 but not
at time t1. Assume that λa > λb . Then λ jumps down at time t0. The amplitude of the jump is
such that at time t1, λ = λb . Between t0 and t1, λ falls because Ûλ = F (λ) < 0. We conclude that at
time t0, λ jumps down part of the way toward its steady-state value, and that it keeps on falling
slowly toward its new steady-state value until the expected shock occurs. The implication is that
even with expected shocks, comparative statics give the correct sign of the adjustments occurring
when the announcement of the shock is made and in the long run.
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4. Shocks and policies
In this section we use comparative statics to describe how the economy responds to aggregate
demand and supply shocks and to various monetary and scal policies. As discussed in the
previous section, comparative statics completely describe the response of the economy to an
unexpected permanent shock because the equilibrium jumps from one steady state to another in
response to such a shock. The comparative statics are summarized in table 1 and illustrated in
gure 8.
4.1. Aggregate demand shocks
We rst analyze aggregate demand shocks. We parameterize an increase in aggregate demand
by an increase in the subjective discount rate or a decrease in the marginal utility of wealth. A
positive aggregate demand shock shis the IS curve out, as depicted in panels E and F of gure 4,
and it therefore raises interest rates. Note that interest rates are independent of tightness, as
illustrated in panel B of gure 4, so the general-equilibrium response of interest rates to the
aggregate demand shock is the same as the partial-equilibrium response depicted in panels E
and F of gure 4.
Since the IS curve shis out, the AD curve also shis out, as depicted in panel B of gure 8.
Hence, the increase in aggregate demand leads to increases in market tightness and output. Since
tightness is higher, the unemployment rate falls. Consumption increases if the labor market is
slack and decreases if the labor market is tight. If the labor market is efcient, the aggregate
demand shock has no rst-order effect on consumption.
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4.2. Aggregate supply shocks
Next we analyze aggregate supply shocks. We consider two types of shocks: a shock to the pro-
duction capacity and a mismatch shock.
An increase in capacity is illustrated in panel C of gure 8. This increase shis out the AS
and output curves, while the AD curve is unchanged. Hence, consumption increases, tightness
decreases, and the unemployment rate increases. We can show that output increases. Interest
rates do not change.
Following Michaillat and Saez (2015), we parameterize an increase in mismatch as a decrease
in matching efcacy along with a commensurate decrease in matching costs: h(k,v) becomes
σ · h(k,v) and ρ becomes σ · ρ with σ < 1. The efcient tightness and the function τ are not
affected by mismatch. Panel D of gure 8 illustrates an increase in mismatch. The AD curve
does not change, but the AS and output curves shi inward. As a result, consumption decreases,
tightness increases, and output decreases. We can show that the unemployment rate increases.
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Table 1. Comparative statics: aggregate shocks and policies with constant ination
Effect on:
Tightness Consumption Output Unemployment rate Interest rates
Increase in: x c y 1 − f (x) i, r
Aggregate demand + + / 0 / − + − +
Capacity − + + + 0
Labor market mismatch + − − + 0
Money supply
- out of liquidity trap + + / 0 / − + − −
- in liquidity trap 0 0 0 0 0
Helicopter money + + / 0 / − + − ?
Wealth tax + + / 0 / − + − +
Government spending + + / 0 / − + − 0
An increase in aggregate demand results from an increase in the subjective discount rate or a decrease in the
marginal utility of wealth. In the column on consumption, “+/0/−” indicates that consumption increases when the
labor market is slack, does not change when the labor market is efcient, and decreases when the labor market is
tight. In the column on interest rates, “?” indicates that the response of the interest rate can be positive or negative
depending on the utility functions ω and ϕ. Given that ination is constant, both nominal and real interest rate
move in the same way. In the row on government purchase, consumption means total consumption—personal plus
government consumption. Private consumption always falls when government consumption increases.
Interest rates do not change.
The comparative statics are the same in a liquidity trap and away from it because the AD
and AS curves retain the same properties in a trap. This property distinguishes our model from
New Keynesian models, in which aggregate supply shocks have paradoxical effects in liquidity
traps. In these models, a negative aggregate supply shock is contractionary in normal times but
expansionary in a liquidity trap (Eggertsson 2010; Eggertsson and Krugman 2012), even with
wealth in the utility function (Michaillat and Saez 2019c).Whether these paradoxical effects appear
in the data is debated: using a variety of empirical tests, Wieland (2019) rejects the prediction
that negative aggregate supply shocks are expansionary in a liquidity trap. The predictions of our
model are consistent with Wieland’s ndings.
4.3. Conventional monetary policy in and out of a liquidity trap
The only lever that monetary policy chooses is the level of money supply,M(0). A change inM(0)
leads to a change in real money balances. Monetary policy cannot change the growth rate ofM(t),
which must satisfy the steady-state requirement that ÛM(t)/M(t) = pi . We study the comparative
static effects of an increase in real money balances.
Away from a liquidity trap, an increase in real money balances shis out the LM curve,
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as showed in panel C of gure 4, and hence shis out the AD curve, as showed in panel B of
gure 8. Higher money supply therefore leads to lower interest rates, higher tightness, lower
unemployment rate, and higher output. The effect on consumption depends on the state of the
labor market.
As long as the nominal interest rate is positive, monetary policy can control the AD curve and
thus fully accommodate shocks. Suppose that the economy starts with tightness at its efcient
level, which maximizes consumption, and that the government wants to use monetary policy to
keep tightness at this level. A negative aggregate demand shock lowers tightness and requires
an increase in real money balances, and conversely, a positive aggregate demand shock raises
tightness and requires a decrease in realmoney balances.Heremonetary policy absorbs aggregate
demand shocks, thus preventing inefcient economic uctuations. A positive aggregate supply
shock, either an increase in capacity or a decrease in mismatch, lowers tightness and requires
an increase in real money balances, and conversely, a negative aggregate supply shock raises
tightness and requires a decrease in real money balances. Here monetary policy exacerbates the
effect of aggregate supply shocks on output to achieve efcient economic uctuations.
In a liquidity trap,monetary policy cannot accommodate shocks anymore because realmoney
balances do not inuence the LM curve and thus cannot control the AD curve. This situation
is illustrated in panel A of gure 5. Monetary policy becomes ineffective. Of course, monetary
policy could still be effective if it could change ination. We know that higher ination stimulates
the IS curve and thus the AD curve, even in a liquidity trap, as showed in panel D of gure 4. But
we assume here that monetary policy has no effect on ination, consistent with the empirical
evidence presented by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
4.4. Helicopter drop of money
Conventional monetary policy is not effective in a liquidity trap. We now present other policies
that remain effective in this situation.
We start by analyzing a helicopter drop of money, rst discussed by Friedman (1969). Money
comes from two sources: a quantityMb(t) = −B(t) of money is issued by buying bonds through
openmarket operations, and a quantityMh(t) ofmoney is printed and given directly to households
through a helicopter drop. Total money supply isM(t) = Mb(t) +Mh(t). Real money balances
aremb(t) = Mb(t)/p(t) andmh(t) = Mh(t)/p(t) andm(t) = M(t)/p(t). Real wealth is no longer
zero because helicopter money contributes to real wealth: real wealth is a(t) = (B(t) +Mb(t) +
Mh(t))/p(t) =mh(t).
With helicopter money, our analysis carries over by adjusting the marginal utility of wealth
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fromω′(0) toω′(mh). The IS curve now depends on helicopter money:
cIS (i,x ,pi ,mh) =
[
δ + pi − i
[1 + τ (x)] · ω′(mh)
]ϵ
.
Since the functionω is concave, an increase in helicopter money shis the IS curve outward in a
(c, i) plane, as showed in panel A of gure 9.11 It also shis the LM curve outward at it raises real
money balances. The AD curve depends on both total and helicopter money:
cAD(x ,pi ,m,mh) =
[
δ + pi
[1 + τ (x)] · (ϕ′(m) + ω′(mh)) ]ϵ .
A helicopter drop of money shis the AD curve out in a (c,x) plane, as in panel B of gure 8.
Although open-market money cannot stimulate the AD curve in a liquidity trap, helicopter
money stimulates the AD curve even in a liquidity trap. Helicopter money is effective in a liquidity
trap because it stimulates both the LM and the IS curve, and the IS channel is immune to the
liquidity trap. In contrast, open-market money only stimulates the LM curve, and the LM channel
does not operate in a liquidity trap.
One drawback of a helicopter drop of money is that it is harder to reverse than open market
operations. Effectively, reversing a helicopter drop of money requires to take away money from
households with no compensation—taxing money held by households and destroying it.
11The efcacy of a helicopter drop ofmoney requires concave utility of wealth.With linear utility of wealth,ω ′(mh)
is constant and helicopter money does not shi the IS curve. In that case, a helicopter drop of money is ineffective.
24
4.5. Tax on wealth
Another way to stimulate aggregate demand in a liquidity trap is to tax wealth at rate τ a(t). The
wealth tax applies to the entire wealth, bond holdings plus money balances. The tax raises no
revenue as the aggregate wealth is zero. But the tax changes the law of motion of the consumer’s
wealth and the consumption Euler equation. The law of motion becomes
Ûa(t) = f (x(t)) · k − [1 + τ (x(t))] · c(t) − i(t) ·m(t) + (r (t) − τ a(t)) · a(t) + s(t).
Therefore, the Euler equation becomes
[1 + τ (x(t))] · ua(c(t),m(t),a(t))
uc(c(t),m(t),a(t)) + (r (t) − τ
a(t) − δ ) = −
Ûλ(t)
λ(t) ,
and the IS curve admits a new expression:
cIS (i,x ,pi ,τ a) =
[
δ + τ a + pi − i
[1 + τ (x)] · ω′(0)
]ϵ
.
An increase in the wealth tax shis the IS curve outward in a (c, i) plane, as showed in panel B of
gure 9. The LM curve remains the same. The AD curve is now a function of the wealth tax:
cAD(x ,pi ,m,τ a) =
[
δ + τ a + pi
[1 + τ (x)] · (ϕ′(m) + ω′(0))
]ϵ
.
An increase in the wealth tax shis the AD curve outward in a (c,x) plane, as in panel B of gure 8.
Since the wealth tax acts on the IS curve and not the LM curve, the wealth tax is effective in a
liquidity trap. The intuition for the effectiveness of the tax is simple: taxing wealth makes holding
wealth more costly and hence less desirable, hereby stimulating current consumption.
4.6. Government spending
The last policy that we consider is the purchase of д(t) units of services by the government.
We begin by assuming that government purchases are nanced by a lump-sum tax τ (t). The
government’s budget constraint imposes that p(t) · д(t) = τ (t). We assume that government
spending enters separately into households’ utility function such that д(t) does not affect the
consumption and saving choices of the households. Accordingly, the IS and LM curves remain
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the same, and д only enters in the AD curve:
(14) cAD(x ,pi ,m,д) =
[
δ + pi
[1 + τ (x)] · (ϕ′(m) + ω′(0))
]ϵ
+
д
1 + τ (x) .
We abuse notation and keep the labels cAD and cAS for the AD and AS curves, even though c is
personal consumption whereas the AD and AS curves measure total consumption—personal plus
government consumption. An increase in government spending shis the AD curve outward, as
showed in panel B of gure 8.
Government spending remains effective in a liquidity trap because they do not rely on the LM
curve. However, government spending is not especially effective in a liquidity trap. What matters
for the effectiveness of government spending are the slopes of the AD and AS curves. In that, our
model sharply differs from theNewKeynesianmodel, which predicts that governmentmultipliers
are much larger in a liquidity trap (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Woodford 2011).
Following the logic described in Michaillat (2014), Michaillat and Saez (2019b), and Ghassibe
and Zanetti (2019), however, the government multiplier is higher when the economy is slack than
when it is tight. What matters for the size of the multiplier in our model is the amount of slack in
the economy and not the liquidity trap. Our ndings are consistent with the empirical nding
that multipliers seem higher when unemployment is higher or output is lower (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko 2012; Candelon and Lieb 2013; Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska 2015). For instance,
estimating regime-switching SVARs on US data, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, table 1)
nd that while the output multiplier is 0.6 in expansions and 1 on average, it is as high as 2.5 in
recessions.
An increase in government spending leads to higher output but not always to higher total
consumption. Following the usual logic, total consumption increases when the market is slack,
decreaseswhen themarket is tight, and does not changewhen themarket is efcient. Government
consumption always crowds out personal consumption. Crowding out arises because an increase
in government spending shis the AD curve outward and raises market tightness; therefore, it
is more expensive for households to purchase goods: the effective price (1 + τ (x)) · p increases.
Households reduce consumption because of the increase in effective price. Crowding out is partial
when the market is slack, one-for-one when the market is efcient, and more than one-for-one
when the market is tight.
Finally, there is a simple interaction between scal and monetary policy. As long as monetary
policy is able to maintain the market at efciency, scal policy should follow public-nance
considerations: the economy is always efcient so there is no reason to use government spending
for stabilization purposes. If monetary policy cannot maintain the economy at efciency, scal
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policy can play a role to stabilize the economy, in addition to public-nance considerations. This
would happen for instance when the economy is in a liquidity trap and monetary policy cannot
stimulate aggregate demand. Michaillat and Saez (2019b) formalize this discussion and provide
an formula for optimal stimulus spending when unemployment is inefcient.
5. Model with Phillips curve
In the previous sections ination was constant. Although the approximation that ination is
constant seems useful and realistic to describe the short run, this approximation may be unsat-
isfactory to describe the medium run. In the medium run, a Phillips curve likely describes the
joint dynamics of ination and slack. In this section, we propose a version of the model that is
more appropriate to describe the medium run. This version combines directed search as in Moen
(1997) with costly price adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982). In equilibrium, ination dynamics
are described by a Phillips curve.
To simplify the exposition, we specialize the utility (11) by setting ϵ = 1 and ϕ(m) = ln(m):
(15) u(c,m,a) = ln(c) + ln(m) + ω(a).
By using log utility over money, we set the money bliss point to innity and ensure that the
economy never enters a liquidity trap. Studying the properties of the equilibrium with Phillips
curve in a liquidity trap would be challenging: as in New Keynesian models, the analysis of
liquidity traps with a Phillips curve raises difcult issues. It is possible that these issues could
be tackled by assuming wealth in the utility function, following the logic in Michaillat and Saez
(2019c); we leave this analysis for future work.
Finally, we assume that the money supply remains constant over time:M(t) = M for all t .
Unlike in a New Keynesian where monetary policy follows an interest-rate rule, monetary policy
is completely passive here.
5.1. Seller’s problem
We begin by solving the representative seller’s problem when buyers direct their search towards
the most attractive markets but adjusting prices is costly to sellers. Buyers choose the market
where they buy labor services based on the price,p, and tightness,x , in thatmarket.Whatmatters
for buyers is the effective price they pay, p · (1 + τ (x)). When a seller sets a price, she takes into
account the effect of her price on the tightness she faces, which in turn determines howmuch
labor services she sells. The solution of the seller’s problem yields a Phillips curve.
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As inMoen (1997), we assume that sellers post their pricep(t) and that buyers arbitrage across
sellers until they are indifferent across sellers. This means that search for labor services is not
random but directed. For a given price p(t), the tightness that a seller faces is given by
(16) [1 + τ (x(t))] · p(t) = e(t)
where e(t) is the effective price in the economy. The effective price is taken as given by buyers
and sellers. This condition simply says that buyers are indifferent between all sellers. Sellers can
choose high prices and get few buyers or low prices and get many buyers. If a seller chooses a
price p(t), her probability to sell therefore is
F (p(t)) ≡ f (x(t)) = f
(
τ−1
(
e(t)
p(t) − 1
))
.
A useful result is that the derivative of F is F ′(p) = −(1 − η) · f (x)/(η · τ (x) · p). Absent any
price-adjustment cost, sellers choose p(t) to maximize p(t) · f (x(t)) subject to (16); that is, they
choose x(t) to maximize f (x(t))/(1+ τ (x(t))) = f (x(t)) − ρ · x(t); thus, they set f ′(x(t)) = ρ and
x(t) = x∗ is efcient. This is the central efciency result of Moen (1997).
We add price-adjustment costs to the directed search setting. We follow the price-adjustment
specication of Rotemberg (1982). Sellers incur a cost ( Ûp(t)/p(t))2 ·κ(t)/2when they change their
prices, where κ(t) = κ · p(t) · y(t). This cost is quadratic in the growth rate of prices, Ûp(t)/p(t),
and scaled by the size of the economy p(t) · y(t) and a cost parameter κ. If κ = 0, prices adjust at
no cost.
The representative seller takes e(t), κ(t), and i(t) as given and chooses a price level p(t), a
price growth rate pi (t), and a tightness x(t) to maximize the discounted sum of nominal prots
(17)
∫ +∞
0
e−I (t) ·
[
p(t) · f (x(t)) · k − κ(t)
2
· pi (t)2
]
dt ,
subject to (16) and to the law of motion for the price level
(18) Ûp(t) = pi (t) · p(t).
The seller’s discount rate is I (t) =
∫ t
0 i(s)ds. To solve the seller’s problem, we express x(t) as a
function of p(t) using f (x(t)) = F (p(t)) and set up the current-value Hamiltonian
H(t ,pi (t),p(t)) = p(t) · F (p(t)) · k − κ(t)
2
· pi (t)2 + µ(t) · pi (t) · p(t)
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with control variable pi (t), state variable p(t), and current-value costate variable µ(t). The neces-
sary conditions for an interior solution to this maximization problem areHpi (t ,pi (t),p(t)) = 0
andHp(t ,pi (t),p(t)) = i(t) · µ(t) − Ûµ(t), together with the appropriate transversality condition.
The rst condition implies that
(19)
κ(t)
p(t) · pi (t) = µ(t).
Recall that r (t) = i(t) − pi (t) denotes the real interest rate. The second condition implies that
(20) Ûµ(t) = r (t) · µ(t) +
[
1 − η
η
· 1
τ (x(t)) − 1
]
· f (x(t)) · k .
In a symmetric equilibrium, κ(t)/p(t) = κ · y(t) = κ · f (x(t)) · k so the rst optimality
condition simplies to
(21) κ · f (x(t)) · k · pi (t) = µ(t).
As the elasticity of f (x) is 1 − η, log-differentiating (21) with respect to time yields
Ûµ(t)
µ(t) = (1 − η) ·
Ûx(t)
x(t) +
Ûpi (t)
pi (t)
Combining this equation with (20) yields
(22) Ûpi (t) =
[
r (t) − (1 − η) · Ûx(t)
x(t)
]
· pi (t) + 1
κ
·
[
1 − η
η
· 1
τ (x(t)) − 1
]
.
This differential equation describes sellers’ optimal pricing; it underlies the Phillips curve.
5.2. Equilibrium
Here we derive the dynamical system describing the equilibrium. The system is composed of
three equations: a consumption Euler equation, a Phillips curve, and a law of motion for the
marginal utility of money.
The consumption Euler equation describes the solution to the household’s problem. It is given
by (10), but it is convenient to rewrite it as a differential equation in x . Using (15), (10) becomes
ω′(0) · f (x(t)) · k + r (t) − δ = −
Ûλ(t)
λ(t) .
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Using the utility function (15) and thematching equation (2), the rst-order condition (6) becomes
f (x(t)) · k = 1/λ(t). Log-differentiating this equation with respect to time, we obtain
−
Ûλ(t)
λ(t) = (1 − η) ·
Ûx(t)
x(t)
which yields the Euler equation
(23) (1 − η) · Ûx(t)
x(t) = r (t) − (δ − ω
′(0) · f (x(t)) · k) .
We now turn to the Phillips curve. To ease notation, we denote the tightness gap as
G(x(t)) = 1 − 1 − η
η
· 1
τ (x(t)) .
The functionG increases in x , is positive if x > x∗, negative if x < x∗, and zero if x = x∗. It
measures how far the market is from efciency. Combining (22) with the Euler equation (23) to
eliminate Ûx(t) yields the Phillips curve
(24) Ûpi (t) = [δ − ω′(0) · f (x(t)) · k] · pi (t) − 1
κ
·G(x(t))
The two differences with the usual Phillips curve in New Keynesian models is that the tightness
gap,G(x(t)), replaces the usual output gap and the effective discount rate δ − ω′(0) · f (x) · k
replaces the usual discount rate δ . Using the Phillips curve, we can express ination as the
discounted sum of future tightness gaps:
pi (t) = 1
κ · f (x(t))
∫ ∞
t
G(x(s)) · f (x(s)) · eR(t)−R(s) ds,
with R(t) =
∫ t
0 r (s)ds. This expression is obtained by integrating the differential equation (20)
and using (21).
A last equation is required to describe the dynamics of the real interest rates, r (t). This
equation is based on the dynamics of real money balances. Let ψ (t) = ϕ′(M/p(t)) = p(t)/M
denote the marginal utility of real money balances. SinceM is xed and p(t) is a state variable,
ψ (t) is a state variable. Asψ (t) = p(t)/M, the law of motion ofψ (t) is
(25) Ûψ (t) = pi (t) ·ψ (t).
Using (7), we nd that i(t) = ψ (t) · f (x(t)) · k and r (t) = i(t) − pi (t) = f (x(t)) · k ·ψ (t) − pi (t).
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Hence we can rewrite the Euler equation as
(26) Ûx(t) = x(t)
1 − η · [f (x(t)) · k · (ψ (t) + ω
′(0)) − δ − pi (t)] .
The dynamical system of (25), (24), and (26) describes the behavior over time of the vector
[ψ (t),pi (t),x(t)] representing the equilibrium. It is a nonlinear systemof differential equations. In
this system, x(t) and pi (t) are jump variables andψ (t) is a state variable. Proposition 3 determines
the properties of the dynamical system:
Proposition 3. The vector [ψ (t),pi (t),x(t)] describing the equilibrium satises the dynamical
system {(25), (24), (26)}. The dynamic system admits a unique steady state. This steady state has
no ination, ecient tightness, and an interest rate below the subjective discount rate: pi = 0,
x = x∗, and i = ψ · y∗ = δ − ω′(0) · y∗, where y∗ = f (x∗) · k is the ecient output level.
Around the steady state, the dynamic system is a saddle, and the stable manifold is a line. Since
the system has one state variable (ψ ) and two jump variables (x and pi ), this property implies that
the equilibrium is determinate. At the steady state, the stable manifold is tangent to the vector
z = [ψ/γ3, 1, (y∗ ·ψ − γ3) · x∗ · κ], where γ3 = (δ/2) ·
[
1 − √1 + 4/(κ · δ 2 · (1 − η))] < 0. The
responses of the equilibrium to small shocks are determined by z and summarized in table 2.
Proof. In steady state, Ûψ = Ûpi = Ûx = 0. Sinceψ (t) > 0, (25) implies that pi = 0. There is no
ination in steady state, which is not surprising because there is no money growth. Since pi = 0,
(24) implies thatG(x) = 0 and x = x∗. Themarket tightness is efcient in steady state. Thismeans
that prices always adjust in the long run to bring the economy to efciency. The mechanism
is that the price level determines real money balances and thus aggregate demand—this is the
LM channel discussed in section 4. This channel operates as long as the economy is not in a
liquidity trap. Last, (26) with pi = 0 implies that (ψ + ω′(0)) · y∗ = δ with y∗ = f (x∗) · k. Thus
ψ = δ/y∗ − ω′(0) and i = ψ · y = δ − ω′(0) · y∗.
To study the stability properties of the system around its steady state, we need to determine
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J of the system evaluated at the steady state. Simple
computations exploiting the fact that in steady state pi = 0, x = x∗,G(x∗) = 0,G′(x∗) = 1/x∗, and
(ψ + ω′(0)) · f (x∗) · k − δ = 0, imply that
J =

0 ψ 0
0 ψ · y∗ − 1κ·x∗
y∗·x∗
1−η
−x∗
1−η δ
 .
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Figure 10. Response of the equilibrium with Phillips curve to an unexpected shock
The characteristic polynomial of J is
P(X ) = (X −ψ · y∗) ·
[
−X 2 + δ · X + 1
κ · (1 − η)
]
,
so J admits three real eigenvalues:
γ1 = ψ · y∗ > 0
γ2 =
δ
2
·
[
1 +
√
1 +
4
κ · δ 2 · (1 − η)
]
> 0
γ3 =
δ
2
·
[
1 −
√
1 +
4
κ · δ 2 · (1 − η)
]
< 0.
Therefore, the system is a saddle path around the steady state, and the stable manifold is a line.
Since the system has one state variable (ψ ) and two jump variables (x and pi ), this property implies
that the system does not suffer from dynamic indeterminacy. Suppose that the economy is at its
steady state. In response to an unexpected and permanent shock at t = 0, bothx andpi jump to the
intersection of the new stable line and the plane {ψ = ψ0}, whereψ0 denotes the old steady-state
value ofψ . The economy remains on the plane {ψ = ψ0}, orthogonal to theψ axis, right aer the
shock because the state variableψ cannot jump. This intersection is unique so the response of
the system to the shock is determinate.
Finally, we compute the eigenvector z associated with the negative eigenvalue, γ3. The stable
line is tangent to z at the new steady state. Hence, this vector allows us to describe qualitatively
the response of the equilibrium to aggregate demand and supply shocks, and monetary policy.
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The eigenvector is dened by Jz = γ3z. Simple calculation shows that this eigenvector is
z =
[
ψ
γ3
, 1, (y∗ ·ψ − γ3) · x∗ · κ
]
.
Using this vector, we obtain the responses to unexpected and permanent shocks described in
table 2. We now justify these responses.
We begin with two preliminary observations. First, irrespective of the shock, pi and x always
keep the same values in steady state, at pi = 0 and x = x∗. The steady states are therefore all
aligned along a line {pi = 0,x = x∗}, parallel to theψ axis. Second, as γ3 < 0, the coordinates
of the eigenvector z along dimensions pi and x are both positive—the coordinates are 1 > 0
and (y∗ ·ψ − γ3) · x∗ · κ > 0. This property is depicted in panel A of gure 10. Hence, x and pi
always move together in response to shocks—either they both increase, or they both decrease.
In response to unexpected shocks, our Phillips curve therefore predicts a positive correlation
between market tightness and ination, or a negative correlation between unemployment and
ination, in the spirit of the traditional Phillips curve.
Next, consider a positive aggregate demand shock. For concreteness, assume that themarginal
utility for wealth,ω′(0), decreases. In steady state, the marginal utility for money satisesψ =
δ/y∗ − ω′(0) so a lowerω′(0) implies a higherψ . Since the coordinate of the eigenvector z along
dimension ψ is ψ/γ3 < 0, pi and x necessarily jump up on impact. This jump is depicted in
panel B of gure 10. The responses of y and i follow because y = f (x) · k and i = ψ · y . The
mechanism is that aer the shock, prices cannot adjust immediately so the economy becomes
tight; unemployment is lower and output is higher than efcient. As sellers face a tight market,
they increase prices—ination is positive. As prices rise, real money balances decrease andψ
increases. This adjustment continues until the new steady state is reached. A monetary policy
shock dened as a change in money supply has the same effects on all variables except i.
Last, a positive aggregate supply shock has exactly the same effect on tightness and ination
as a negative aggregate demand shock. For concreteness, assume that capacity, k, increases.
In steady state, the marginal utility for money satisesψ = δ/(f (x∗) · k) − ω′(0) so a higher k
implies a lowerψ , exactly like a negative aggregate demand shock. Hence, pi and x necessarily
jump down on impact aer a positive aggregate supply shock. The response of output is more
complicated because y = f (x) · k and x jumps down whereas k jumps up. However, we can
exploit the eigenvector z to prove that the jump of x is always larger than that of k. Hence, y
jumps down on impact and increases during the dynamic adjustment toward its new higher
steady-state value. The response of i follows because i = ψ · y . 
With directed search and costly price adjustment, prices converge slowly toward efciency.
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Table 2. Dynamic response of the equilibrium with Phillips curve to shocks
Short-run / long-run effect on:
Tightness Ination Price Output Interest rate
Increase in: x pi p y i
Aggregate demand + / 0 + / 0 0 / + + / 0 + / +
Money supply + / 0 + / 0 0 / + + / 0 − / 0
Aggregate supply − / 0 − / 0 0 / − − /+ − / −
The symbol “X/Y ” indicates that the response of a variable to a shock isX on impact andY in steady state. Transition
from impact to new steady state is monotonic for x , pi , and p. An increase in aggregate demand is an increase in
the subjective discount rate or a decrease in the marginal utility of wealth. An increase in aggregate supply is an
increase in capacity or a decrease in mismatch.
The mechanism is simple. If prices are too high, new markets are created with lower prices but
higher tightness. If prices are too low, new markets are created with higher prices but lower
tightness. Sellers and buyers have incentives tomove to these newmarkets because they aremore
efcient so there is a larger surplus to share. Sellers are compensated for the lower price with
a higher probability to sell. Buyers are compensated for the higher matching wedge by a lower
price. Lazear (2010) nds evidence of such behavior for price and tightness in the US housing
market.
This analysis could be used to formalize the conict between price adjustment and ination
adjustment discussed by Tobin (1993). In response to a shock, the price adjustment requires an
ination change that further destabilizes the economy, possibly making the recession worse or
exacerbating the overheating. This suggests that, even if price adjustments are fairly fast, the
temporary ination changes could amplify short-run uctuations in tightness and output. For
instance, aer a negative aggregate demand shock ination jumpsdown to allowprices to fall. This
fall in prices increase real money balances and stimulates aggregate demand, which eventually
brings the economy at efciency. But a decrease in ination has a temporary negative effect on
aggregate demand and tightness. This negative effect is illustrated in panel D of gure 4, where
we show that a decrease in ination depresses the IS curve and thus the AD curve. The economic
mechanism is that lower ination implies higher real interest rates, which lead households to
want to accumulate more wealth and hence consume less.
With costly price adjustment, assuming away liquidity traps, monetary policy can accommo-
date all shocks. A monetary expansion, dened as an increase in money supply, can absorb a neg-
ative aggregate demand shock so that output, ination, and tightness remain at their steady-state
level at the time of the shock. Conversely, monetary tightening can absorb a positive aggregate
demand shock. A monetary expansion can accommodate a positive aggregate supply shock so
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that the economy jumps immediately to its new steady state with zero ination, efcient tightness,
and higher output. Conversely, monetary tightening can accommodate a negative supply shock.
In all cases, monetary policy should be based on tightness rather than output as efcient output
varies with some shocks such as supply shocks while efcient tightness does not.12
5.3. Limit with zero price-adjustment cost
On the one hand, if the price-adjustment cost is innite then ination equals zero. This can be
seen in the rst-order condition (19), where pi (t) = 0 if κ(t) → +∞. This corresponds to the
model studied in sections 2–4. On the other hand, at the limit without price-adjustment cost,
sellers always select a price to maintain the tightness at its efcient level as in Moen (1997). This
can be seen by combining the rst-order condition (19), where µ(t) = 0 if κ(t) = 0, with the
rst-order condition (20), where τ (x(t)) = (1 − η)/η if µ(t) = 0; that is, x(t) = x∗ when κ(t) = 0.
This limit without price-adjustment cost describes an economywith exible prices that always
maintain themarket for labor services at efciency.Without price-adjustment cost, market forces
drive prices to maintain tightness at efciency, where consumption is maximized. If tightness
were not efcient, both buyers and sellers would be better off with a price adjustment and
a corresponding tightness adjustment. An implication is that aggregate demand shocks have
no impact on tightness or consumption or output when prices are exible. Aggregate supply
shocks have no impact on tightness either, but they have an impact on consumption and output.
Effectively, aggregate demand is irrelevant to understand the economy with exible prices.
With a nite bliss point in the utility for money,m∗ < +∞, a large negative aggregate demand
shock could bring the economy into a liquidity trap, whereby real money balances are above
the bliss point but tightness is still below its efcient level. In that case, the directed search
mechanism implies that sellers want to lower their price to increase the tightness they face, even
though this does not increase tightness in general equilibrium. The economy may fall into an
instantaneous deationary spiral with no steady-state equilibrium.13 Hence, liquidity traps are
worse with exible prices than with constant ination, in line with the results in Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012).
12Alternatively, instead of choosing the level ofM, the central bank could set the nominal interest rate i to follow
an interest-rate rule of the form i = α · pi with α > 1. A negative shock increasing slack leads to negative ination
that prompts the central bank to lower i. Under this monetary policy, the economy immediately adjusts to shocks to
remain at x = x∗ and pi = 0. New Keynesian models have the same property.
13Increasing ination could push the economy out the trap. However, aer the shock has happened and the
economy is in a liquidity trap, conventional monetary policy cannot inuence ination anymore even with exible
prices. Helicopter drops or the wealth tax could still successfully pull the economy out of the liquidity trap.
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Figure 11. Unemployment gap in the United States (source: Michaillat and Saez 2019a)
6. Conclusion
In this paperwedevelop amodel of business cycles anduse it to study a broad range of stabilization
policies. The main attributes of the model are that (1) cyclical uctuations in demand and supply
lead to uctuations in slack but not in ination; and (2) liquidity traps may be permanent andmay
feature positive ination and high unemployment. Hence, in the model, market forces are not
able to move ination around to maintain the economy at efciency; neither are market forces
able to bring the economy out of liquidity traps.
Since our model is quite different from the standard New Keynesian model, it offers new
insights for the conduct of monetary policy and scal policy. An advantage of thematching theory
of unemployment is that it lends itself well to welfare analysis. With current unemployment and
vacancy rates, and estimates of three sufcient statistics (slope of the Beveridge curve, recruiting
cost, and nonpecuniary value of unemployment), it is possible to construct a real-timemeasure of
the unemployment gap—something that nobody has been able to do with the output gap. Figure 11
depicts the unemployment gap constructed by Michaillat and Saez (2019a) from the Beveridge
curve in the United States. The graph shows that the US unemployment gap is almost always
positive and highly countercyclical—indicating that the labor market tends to be inefciently
slack, especially in slumps.
The unemployment-gap series in gure 11 indicates that there is much scope for monetary
and scal policy to stabilize the economy over the business cycle. Equipped with our economical
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business-cycle model, we could compute the optimal response of monetary and scal policy such
deviations from efciency. These optimal responses are fairly simple to characterize.
First, if that is at all possible, monetary policy should completely ll the unemployment
gap. So by observing the current unemployment gap as well as the impact of monetary policy
on unemployment, we could obtain a simple prescription for optimal monetary policy. A large
literature is measuring the effect of monetary policy on unemployment (for example, Bernanke
and Blinder 1992; Romer and Romer 2004; Coibion 2012). Combining this evidence with the
measure of the unemployment gap in gure 11, we could determine the optimal monetary policy
at any point int time, and assess the conduct of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve.
Of course, if the unemployment gap is too large, monetary policy may not be sufcient to
completely ll it. If the nominal interest rate needs to fall signicantly, it will eventually run
against the zero lower bound; at this point, alternative stabilization policies are required. One
policy that is commonly used in that case is to increase public expenditure through a stimulus
package. This is exactly what happened during the Great Recession in the United States (Wilson
2012). Combining the formula for optimal stimulus spending developed by Michaillat and Saez
(2019b), available estimates for the government-spending multipliers (for example, Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko 2012; Ghassibe and Zanetti 2019), and the measure of the unemployment
gap, we could compute the optimal stimulus package for the United States in various situations
and under various calibrations. We could highlight general principles for the design of optimal
stimulus spending, discussing in particular the role of taxation.
Beside government spending, we could study other possible stabilization policies. We could
describe for instance how forward guidance operates in our model, following the analysis of
Michaillat and Saez (2019c) in the New Keynesian model. An advantage of having a modied
Euler equation through the introduction of wealth in the utility is that the model is not subject
to any type of forward-guidance puzzle. Therefore, the analysis of forward guidance would be
relevant and applicable to the real world. Other policies that could be effective in a liquidity trap
include a helicopter drop of money or a tax on wealth.
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